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Abstract 
The historical sensibility of Western modernity is best captured by the phrase “acting upon 
a story that we can believe.” Whereas the most famous stories of historians facilitated nation-
building processes, philosophers of history told the largest possible story to act upon: history 
itself. When the rise of an overwhelming postwar skepticism about the modern idea of 
history discredited the entire enterprise, the historical sensibility of “acting upon a story that 
we can believe” fell apart to its constituents: action, story form, and belief in a feasible future 
outcome. Its constituent parts are nevertheless still hold, either separately or in paired 
arrangements. First, believable stories are still told, but without an equally believable future 
outcome to facilitate. Second, in the shape of what I call the prospect of unprecedented 
change, there still is a feasible vision of a future (in prospects of technology and the 
Anthropocene), but it defies story form. And third, it is even possible to upon that feasible 
future, but such action aims at avoiding worst case scenarios instead of facilitating best 
outcomes. These are, I believe, features of an emerging postwar historical sensibility that the 
theory and philosophy of history is yet to understand. 
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Acting Upon a Story That We Can Believe 
 
Acting upon a story that we can believe – I cannot think of a phrase that better captures the 
modern historical sensibility. For histories were not merely told throughout Western 
modernity. To a large extent, although not exclusively, they have been told and written in 
order to facilitate the desired full realization of what they were about: nations, human 
emancipation, or modernity itself as a process of modernization. Yet, by introducing the 
phrase, I do not intend to describe a currently dominant form of societal appeal to history. 
What I hope to adequately name instead is a certain sense of historicity that Western societies 
are about to abandon by increasingly appealing to another that is emerging in the broadly 
understood post-Second World War period (stretching until now). This new historical 
sensibility attests today to the impossibility of holding together the constituents of the 
modern one: action, story form, and belief in a feasible future outcome. 
The phrase “acting upon a story that we can believe” attempts to provide a 
conceptual understanding of both senses of historicity in their relation to each other. 
Accordingly, the plausibility and the significance of describing the modern Western appeal 
to history as feasible stories to act upon derives partly from an examination of its postwar 
disintegration. Most of the coming pages will attempt to carry out this work. There are, 
however, good reasons to consider the modern historical sensibility as “acting upon a story 
that we can believe” on its own right too. Hence, before beginning to argue for its 
disintegration, I would like to illuminate the sense in which acting upon believable stories 
defined the sense of historicity of the modern Western world. 
To begin with a terminological clarification, by “historical sensibility” and “sense of 
historicity” I do not mean an actual sensation of history. I rather mean a mode of sense-
making, a distinctively “historical” mode of conceiving of ourselves and the world as 
changing over time. It can take the shape of a conscious activity, an implied attitude, or a 
non-reflexive way of relating to the world and things of the world upon which we do not 
necessarily reflect. Unlike the terms “historical thinking” and “historical consciousness” 
which imply self-awareness and refer to a deliberate engagement, “historical sensibility” as 
used here refers to a more general and all-encompassing mode of apprehending and 
appropriating ourselves and the world which may happen even in unconscious ways. 
Professionalized and institutionalized historiography is only one representative of such a 
historical sensibility, although probably the most powerful one. Together with philosophy of 
history, it is jointly responsible for the modern invention and dissemination of the agenda of 
acting upon a believable story as the story of history itself. 
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Talking about the modern invention of history is in harmony with the most excellent 
scholarship of Reinhart Koselleck on the birth of the temporalized concept of history in the 
period between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth century. According to Koselleck 
(2004, 194), “one of the conceptual achievements of the philosophy of the Enlightenment 
was enhancing history into a general concept which became the condition of possible 
experience and possible expectation.” Prior to this, in the Christian worldview, “there was 
no history for which humanity might have been the subject or which could be thought of as 
its own subject” (Koselleck 2004, 194). Although Koselleck emphasizes the extent to which 
such a unitary concept of history brought together individual histories in a collective singular, 
it seems to me the most momentous aspect of this conceptual innovation lies elsewhere, 
namely, in rendering change for the better in human affairs possible. Whereas the Christian 
worldview granted the possibility of change for the better by divine intervention and as an 
entrance into another world, the late Enlightenment brought about the concept of history as 
future-oriented course, over which change in the world of human affairs plays out as executed 
by humans. 
Koselleck, I think, tries to capture this aspect by referring to the “makeability” of 
history. Once the future opened up and change for the better in human affairs became a 
possibility as the course of history, that possible change became prone to facilitation. 
Koselleck (2004, 197) attributes the establishment of the makeability of history to Kant by 
claiming that Kant attempted to translate “the latent natural plan, which seemed set to force 
humanity onto the course of unlimited progress, into a conscious plan of rationally endowed 
man.” Intentions and results obviously diverged whenever it came to actual attempts to make 
history. Although Koselleck also explores this divergence, I do not wish to follow his 
investigations further, as the point I want to make concerns only the establishment of the 
possibility of making history by acting upon an already assumed course of affairs. 
Besides the affiliation with Koselleck’s study, what I label as providing feasible stories 
for future action is also somewhat close to what Jörn Rüsen (2005) elevates into being one 
of the five principles of modern historical thinking in his disciplinary matrix: temporal 
orientation. The entire matrix, with its focus on not only narrative form but also on 
methodological rules, is designed to be an interpretation of historical studies. But the story 
form and what Rüsen considers to be the orienting function seems to be shared by 
historiography with other practices relying on the very same historical sensibility. For one 
thing, philosophies of history most certainly did not share the methodological rules of 
empirical research (one of Rüsen’s principles) with historical studies. Yet, just like 
historiography according to Rüsen, they provided a practical story to orient and act upon. In 
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the recent interpretation David Carr (2014, 140) this means that although philosophies of 
history often used “the language of prediction and even prophesy,” they were “expressing a 
practical attitude toward the future and participating, through their language and their 
concepts, in an effort to move history in a certain direction.” What is more, Carr (2014, 140) 
even states that such “an attitude toward history” is something that “in the modern world” 
we all “share to some extent, whether we are philosopher or not.” 
 Although I have serious reservation about Carr’s overall phenomenological approach to 
history, I think that he is right about the modern practical attitude. But history itself, with 
the central character humanity, is only the largest possible story to act upon, typically by 
philosophies of history. It is still an open question whether professionalized historical studies 
can reasonably be said to exhibit a similar attitude when telling their smaller scale stories. 
Considering nineteenth-century historiographies of nation which themselves facilitated 
nation-building by writing its story (Berger with Conrad 2015), the answer is rather obviously 
affirmative. Especially in the case of romantic historiography and its main representative, 
Jules Michelet, who explicitly took pride midwifing the birth of the French nation (Cf. Kogan 
2006; Gossman 1990). A possible counterargument could nevertheless point out that the 
institutionalization and the professionalization of historical studies in the same century took 
place as accompanied by claims concerning the scientific character of the discipline. Such an 
objection would argue that historians themselves oftentimes claimed to study the past for its 
own sake and conduct a disinterested study by appeals to objectivity. 
By addressing this hypothetical objection, it is crucial to make clear how this self-
description and self-conception of the discipline of history in the time of its 
institutionalization has already been refuted by histories of historiography in the last half-
century. It is not merely an accident that Rüsen, as mentioned above, attributes the orienting 
function to the discipline as such, disregarding appeals to disinterestedness. Similarly, Lorenz 
(2008) has shown how historiography could never “draw the line” between their claims to 
be scientific on the one hand their actual involvement in providing practical orientation 
(mostly by creating the aforementioned national myths). But the self-image of scientific 
historiography was advocated strongly enough to convince contemporaries of the 
institutionalization. Even Nietzsche (1980) gave in to it and expressed his contempt for the 
type of history which studies the past for its own sake by labelling it “antiquarian.” Yet, in 
the judgement of today’s history of historiography – as represented here by Iggers (2002, 
236) – “Nietzsche did not understand the extent to which this call for history to become a 
detached science was ignored, and that history rather was used for very practical aims which 
lacked a scientific basis.” Finally, as I argued elsewhere (Simon 2015), even today’s calls for 
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an engagement with practical past (White 2014) or for a return to long-term historical 
interpretations to guide the future (Guldi and Armitage 2014) are, in fact, reminders of what 
the academic discipline of history stood for since its early days. 
All in all, recent work both in the theory of history and the history of historiography 
supports very well an interpretation of the modern historical sensibility as “acting upon a 
story that we can believe.” Regardless of whether philosophies of history or academic 
histories tell it, such a feasible story to act upon assumes a deep continuity over time 
underlying all changes in the condition of the storied subject. Whereas philosophies of 
history typically feature humanity as the protagonist of their plot, particular histories can in 
principle be concerned with the development of practically anything. The endpoint of the 
story, even if it is not recounted explicitly, is in a future outcome and future fulfillment as 
indicated or foreshadowed by the already outlined development of past and present states of 
affairs. In return, the future outcome appears as feasible precisely because there is a 
developmental story pointing toward its direction. There certainly is a circularity involved in 
how a desired future outcome reinforces a story and how, at the same time, the story renders 
the desired future feasible and calls for action in order to achieve the future. The perfect 
example of such a circular reinforcement is the Marxist future of a communist society and 
the story about the route to get there. 
 But this is not to say that professional historical studies and modern philosophies of 
history deliberately called for societal action in order to make their advocated vision of the 
future true by telling a story. This is only to say the modern historical sensibility of “acting 
upon a story that we can believe” underlay historical studies and philosophies of history just 
as much as it underlay more explicit political engagement. As to the latter, communities 
established on stories told by utopian socialism, Comte’s positivism based on an assumed 
law of historical development which inevitably leads to a scientific society, women’s suffrage 
and emancipatory stories, ideas of technological progress and practices of industrialization, 
or today’s modernization theories and efforts attest to the modern sense of historicity. Again, 
rather obviously, this does not mean that such historicity fully informed every instance of 
socio-political action or every piece of academic historiography ever produced. This means 
only that Western modernity gave rise to a concept of history which, according to Hannah 
Arendt (1961, 58), “became a man-made process, the only all-comprehending process which 
owed its existence exclusively to the human race.” 
It cannot be emphasized enough how history as (1) human-made and as (2) a process 
emerged as a specificity of the modern age, establishing the possibility of “acting upon the story 
that we can believe” and kicking off the abovementioned large variety of “historical” 
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endeavors. Its emergence did not immediately dissipate all previous patterns of thoughts and 
modes of actions. Similarly, even if there is a novel kind of historical sensibility emerging, it 
will not make the modern one disappear right away. This is sense in which I will argue for 
the ongoing disintegration of the possibility to “act upon a story that we can believe.” Even 
though Western societies can no longer hold together action, story form, and belief in a 
feasible future outcome in a single agenda, the constituents are still held either separately or 
in paired arrangements, tailored to current socio-cultural concerns. On the coming pages, I 
will sketch three of these dispositions as fundamental features of an emerging postwar 
historical sensibility that the philosophy of history is yet to explore and understand. 
First, although it is still possible to tell believable stories, they are now without an 
equally feasible future outcome to facilitate. This arrangement concerns primarily the socio-
political domain. Second, although there still are feasible vision of the future, they defy story 
form. Instead of appearing as results of gradual betterment, believable postwar visions of the 
future take the shape of unprecedented change, that is, a change that implies a complete 
disconnection from preceding past conditions. Such future prospects feature most 
prominently in the ecological and technological domains. Thirdly and finally, although it is 
even possible to act upon that believable future, the motivation for action no longer derives 
from a desired best outcome. Societal action today aims at avoiding worst prospects of 
unprecedented change which are characteristically dystopian and apocalyptic. 
 
 
Believable Stories without a Future 
 
The situation of feasible stories lacking an equally feasible future outcome can best be 
highlighted a dilemma. On the one hand, as is well known, that the postwar period brought 
about a widespread intellectual suspicion towards the idea of a historical process. Lyotard 
(1984, xxiv) famously condensed this suspicion into a definition of postmodern condition as 
“incredulity toward metanarratives,” in which a metanarrative is distinguished by virtue of 
implying a philosophy of history to legitimize knowledge claims. On the other hand, the 
processual temporality of grand narratives survives to this day in conventional historical 
narratives. As Danto (1985, 1–16) argues, although philosophy of history and historiography 
are different in kind due to the different nature of their respective engagement with the 
future, the grandiosity of narratives of philosophy of history is only different in degree from 
narratives of historiography. Whereas philosophy of history told the story of the whole of 
history from an illegitimate “knowledge” of an assumed future outcome, historiography 
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spares an engagement with the future. Otherwise, according to Danto (1985, 12), the 
former’s “mode of organization, then, is indeed the historical mode of organization.” 
  Danto’s claim about the absence of historiography’s engagement with the future is 
questionable. Especially concerning the modern sense of historicity and modern 
historiography with its paradigmatic involvement in nation-building processes, as reviewed 
in the previous section. Yet it may be right concerning the usual mode of historiography and 
the sense of historicity of Danto’s own time, which is precisely what I will argue for. Before 
that argument, however, I would like to show how Danto’s other claim about the formal 
similarity of philosophy of history and historiography is reinforced and even radicalized by 
Hayden White. In Metahistory, White (1973, ix) aims to show – among many other things – 
that “there can be no ‘proper history’ which is not at the same time ‘philosophy of history,’” 
the latter understood here in the classical sense. If White is right, then insofar as there is 
history as historical writing, there must be philosophy of history, and thus there must be 
ideas of a historical process around, at least as implied by historical studies. What this means 
is not only that historiography and the philosophy of history are of a formal unity, but also 
that they are interdependent. 
 The result is an overtly confused and paradoxical situation in which our current 
historical sensibility seems implicitly rely on an explicitly repudiated idea. Despite all 
suspicion and hostility towards history as process at the largest scale, there is a sustained 
demand for the socio-cultural practices informed by a processual, directional and 
developmental sense of historicity. How to make sense of all this? Is Western thought 
schizophrenic in both denying and engaging in the historical sensibility of “acting upon a 
story that we can believe”? Is it a double bind to get along with or a dilemma waiting to 
resolved? 
The answer I wish to offer is that the simultaneity of the impossibility of the modern 
idea of history and its entailment in socio-cultural practices is indeed a dilemma – but one 
that cannot be resolved. The resolution of the dilemma would be to make a choice: either to 
drop the modern idea of history together with all its socio-cultural practices, or to fully 
commit to pursue both and thereby revive directional and developmental history together 
with the prospect of its supposed future fulfilment. It is only insofar as the dilemma remains 
unresolved – insofar as it remains a dilemma – that it brings about the disintegration of 
“acting upon a story that we can believe.” 
 Hence the first element of the historical sensibility emerging in the post-Second World 
War times is the dilemma itself. Due to the sustained implicit engagement, it is still possible 
to tell directional and developmental stories; but due to the explicit disbelief in the overall 
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idea of history involving a postulated future outcome, it is no longer possible to connect 
such stories to desired futures. As Danto’s critique indicates, the incorporation of the 
postulated future outcome into a story to act upon was exactly what postwar hostility toward 
the idea of history targeted. With the vision of the future being collapsed after the world 
wars, and with the exercise of telling the largest possible story of humanity from the vantage 
point of that future vision being discredited, what remained are stories that end in the present 
and are told from a present point of view. In other words, the novelty of the postwar situation 
is not that grand narratives actually became discredited (they even gain popularity lately in 
various shapes from global to deep histories). The novelty of the situation is the absence of the 
future in the formal structure of stories deemed feasible. It has become difficult to tell stories in order 
to facilitate desired future outcomes, regardless of the grandiosity of stories. 
 This contention resonates more or less with recent cultural diagnoses, as advanced by 
Aleida Assmann (2013), Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht (2014) and François Hartog (2015). In their 
own respective ways, these diagnoses detect a transformation in the way Western societies 
configure a relationship between past, present, and future. Despite salient differences in 
accents and emphases, the diagnoses agree that a future-oriented modern configuration has 
been exchanged for a new arrangement. Whereas Assmann notes a disunity and disjoint in 
the current disposition of past, present, and future, Gumbrecht and Hartog talk about – 
respectively – a broad or an extended present. Eventually, they all end up describing the 
historicity of our times as a prolonged investment in that which is already known and familiar 
by closing off the future. 
These diagnoses may be highly relevant for my argument, even though they seem to 
capture only a piece of the larger picture. The limits of their scope call for two important 
qualifications. To begin with, theories of presentism introduce their turning point in the 
shape of decisive political events, such as the Fall of the Berlin Wall or the end of the Cold 
War. But change concerning long-standing patterns of thought and ways of conceiving of 
the world and ourselves does not belong to the world of political events. It is not merely an 
accident that Koselleck ties the conceptual shift that gave birth to the modern idea of history 
to an entire period covering about a century. Turning points in political history and turning 
periods in the realm of ideas should not be conflated. In light of this – and also the 
abovementioned post-Second World War hostility toward a future-entailed historical process 
– it seems more plausible to claim that change regarding the future-orientation of Western 
societies has emerged somewhat earlier than theories of presentism imply, and is still 
ongoing. 
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Then, the second and closely related qualification concerns the political focus of 
cultural diagnoses. For it is in the explicitly political domain that believable stories are deprived 
of the possibility of acting upon them because the present appears as extended into the 
future. In fact, even Assmann, Gumbrecht, and Hartog do not think that Western societies 
are done with the future. They all note instead that it has become customary to talk about 
the future in catastrophic terms, especially with respect to climate change and technological 
innovations. These are, however, occasional remarks and not attempts at gaining a 
conceptual understanding of such newer future prospects. In the case of Gumbrecht this is 
hardly surprising. Gumbrecht (2015, xiv) openly concedes that “the electronic world, its 
rhythm and its form of communication, are repugnant” to him. What is more, Gumbrecht 
(2015, 64) even makes the not very flattering confession that whenever it comes even only 
to “electronic communication devices,” “I try to know as little about them as I can possibly 
afford.”  
 One could hardly ask for a better justification of the necessity to inquire a bit more 
thoroughly into recent future prospects. Especially in light of the fact that Gumbrecht is a 
major influence on Assmann, and his theory of the broad present parallels Hartog’s ideas 
about an extended present. As insightful as cultural diagnoses are, in my view they do not 
pay sufficient attention to the future component, which brings me directly to the second and 
third elements of our postwar historical sensibility that I wish to introduce. For outside the 
political, a vision of the future reigns and even action is possible. 
 
 
Believable Future That Defies Story Form 
 
Although feasible stories Western societies tell today are lacking an equally feasible future to 
facilitate by societal action, the future itself is not lost. What became unfeasible is a vision of 
the future that could be connected back to the past to conceive of it as a single unfolding 
story. Today, it is increasingly replaced by a specifically postwar vision of the future in the 
Western world that I came to call unprecedented change (Simon 2015; 2017; 2018). From nuclear 
warfare to the ecological prospects of anthropogenic climate change, Western societies 
envision today future scenarios which cannot simply be configured as gradually developing 
out of preceding states of affairs. Yet the unprecedentedness of postwar prospects is 
nowhere more apparent than in technological visions, which gained new life after the initial 
boom and the birth of artificial intelligence research and cybernetics in the 1950’s (see Hayles 
1999). Bioengineering, nanotechnology, various brands of transhumanism, artificial 
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intelligence, the merging of human and the machine, or mind uploading promises today the 
complete alteration of the human condition as we know it. 
When I first introduced the notion of unprecedented change on the occasion of 
discussing the Anthropocene (Simon 2015), my initial hope was that inquiring into the 
historical sensibility that can be traced in the future vision of unprecedented change will 
result in a very different but nevertheless believable story to act upon. I thought that a 
concept of history fitting to the future vision of unprecedented change will simply invent a 
story form other than the developmental one that characterized the modern concept of 
history. But the more time I spent on the issue, and the more time I spent especially on the 
future vision of technology (Simon 2018), the more pressing it became to recognize that the 
future vision of unprecedented change simply defies story form. 
But how exactly does this happen? How can visions of the future resist efforts to 
mold them into story form? To answer this question, the work of historians and theorists of 
history is of limited assistance. True enough, the ecological vision and the notion of the 
Anthropocene have already had an impact on historical thinking and begun to gain a quickly 
accelerating attention after the eye-opener engagement of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009),1 to 
which I will come back later. But the heavily related technological vision and the potentially 
even greater consequences of the prospect of a posthuman / transhuman future for our 
historical sensibility are yet to be explored. Ewa Domanska and Antonis Liakos have 
nevertheless already devoted attention the issue. As for Domanska’s engagement with 
posthumanism, her main focus lies in the divide between human and non-human with 
respect to material objects and animals (Domanska 2006; 2010; 2017). Such understanding 
of posthumanism is linked to a discourse within the disciplines still known as humanities and 
social sciences. It connects to a theoretical critique of humanism, anthropocentrism and 
speciesism that Cary Wolfe reviews in the book What is Posthumanism?. The challenge that 
such critical posthumanism wishes to meet is, according to Wolfe (2010, 62), “the challenge 
of sharing the planet with nonhuman subjects and treating them justly.” 
Critical posthumanism is nevertheless not the only game in town, and for the fate of 
historical sensibility today it is not even the most important. I think that the emerging novel 
sense of historicity has less to do with such posthumanism as a genealogy of philosophical 
criticism fueled (and bounded) by the imagination of humanities scholarship, and more to 
do with the imagination of scientific laboratories. The posthumanism that directly matters 
for Western historical sensibility is the posthumanist / transhumanist vision of technology, 
focusing on beings envisioned as literally post human. Technological posthumanism is not 
concerned with describing already existing non-human inhabitants of the planet as fellows 
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to humans. Instead, it invests in the prospect of bringing about not-yet-existing non-human 
beings in various ways, from enhanced beings escaping human confines to the expected 
creation of greater-than-human machine intelligence. Differently put, technological 
posthumanism envisions the emergence of an era of posthumanity (a prospect about which 
critical posthumanism is, needless to say, critical). 
The expectation of such an epochal transformation is an unmistakable manifestation 
of a sense of historicity. But the amount of reflection it has gathered so far cannot compare 
to already widespread discussions on the Anthropocene (as another evidently “historical” 
marker). Accordingly, when explicitly addressing the question of how this technological 
vision challenges what we think about history, the best conversation partner Liakos finds is 
a tradition of “end of history” theories and not contemporary historical theorists. Maybe this 
why Liakos seems to be concerned with bringing such prospects together with history as we 
know it, without considering the possibility that newer prospects exhibit a sense of historicity 
in their own. 
The suggestion of Liakos (2013, 69–70) is that we should attribute a role to 
historiography as “the discipline of traversing thresholds / boundaries between the human 
and the non-human,” and conceive of the human “as crafted in society.” What this means is 
that Liakos retroactively redefines the notion of history as if it has always included today’s 
concerns in older shapes. If history already conceives of humans “as crafted in society,” there 
is no need to be concerned about what biotechnology advocates today because it no longer 
appears as a radical intervention. And if history is “the discipline of traversing threshold / 
boundaries between the human and the non-human,” then somewhat naturally it already 
understands posthumanism. 
The take-away message of such operations is that there is nothing to worry about, 
there is not much challenge here, historical thinking as we know it is more useful than ever, 
so we can just carry on. Needless to say, this is actually the modern historical sensibility put 
to work and exercised on the challenges posed to itself. It assumes that the new is a newer 
version of the old, that today’s technological engineering of humans is just another grade in 
history as the development of humans always being crafted in society. And all this even 
makes perfect sense in a certain way. For much of the postwar technological visions of the 
future tell the same story about their own deep past, as if their newer concerns were just an 
improvement on already familiar old concerns. Scholars of posthumanism sometimes tell 
stories about how humans were always already posthuman (Ferrando 2016), and even 
transhumanism tells a legitimizing story in which it appears to be consistent with the 
Enlightenment vision of the perfectibility of human beings. This is the ground on which 
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Nick Bostrom (2005, 2), the probably most prominent transhumanist philosopher today, 
claims that “transhumanism has its roots in rational humanism.” 
 Mobilizing the modern sense of historicity in making sense of posthumanity, however, 
does not yield to fruitful results. It simply gives in to the self-conception of the advocates of 
technological prospects, which is not a particularly useful analytical strategy.2 In fact, the 
most interesting aspect of today’s technological visions is the contradiction between 
legitimizing stories and explicit aims. For “The Transhumanist Declaration,” which features 
as an appendix to Bostrom’s article, clearly goes beyond what can reasonably termed as 
improvement upon an already assumed human potential. Consider its opening sentences:  
 
Humanity will be radically changed by technology in the future. We foresee the feasibility of redesigning the 
human condition, including such parameters as the inevitability of ageing, limitations on human and artificial 
intellects, unchosen psychology, suffering, and our confinement to the planet earth. (Bostrom 2005, 21)  
 
No wonder that these words, together with assertions such as “we seek personal growth 
beyond our current biological limitations” (Bostrom 2005, 21), stir controversy. Although 
not as much about the potential of human enhancement as about the ethical question of how 
far should enhancement go,3 because the potential of the technological vision is clear. As 
Nicholas Agar (2010, 13), one of the main opponents of profound changes puts it: “radical 
enhancement is likely to create beings who do not belong to the human species.” 
 The potential of bringing about non-human beings is at the heart of matter. It is the 
most apparent in the vision of the future of artificial intelligence as the creation of beings 
other-than-human with greater-than-human intelligence. “Technological singularity” is the 
term that intends to capture the event-like character of the anticipated change following the 
postulated success of creating superintelligence. The notion has been made popular by 
Vernor Vinge (1993, 12), claiming that “from the human point of view this change will be a 
throwing away of all the previous rules, perhaps in the blink of an eye, an exponential 
runaway beyond any hope of control.” According the argument, is seems reasonable to 
assume that a greater-than-human intelligence would create beings of even greater 
intelligence in an exponential manner. Hence, when Vinge (1993, 14) asks the somewhat 
rhetorical question “And what happens a month or two (or a day or two) after that?,” his 
answer is hardly surprising: “I have only analogies to point to: The rise of humankind. We 
will be in the Post-Human era.” Such a new era as the ultimate prospect of technology is not 
simply about the birth of non-human beings. More importantly, it is about the birth of beings 
greatly outperforming and potentially superseding human beings, with all threats and dangers 
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involved for the continued existence of human beings (Bostrom 2014).  I will address these 
threats in more details in the next section. For now, keeping in mind these considerations, I 
would like to return to principal question of this section concerning how such prospects of 
unprecedented change defy story form. 
The answer begins in a retrospective look at the modern concept of history. When 
classical philosophies of history authored the largest possible story to act upon, they typically 
featured humanity as their protagonist. Whatever changes occurred in their plot, the 
protagonist retained its self-identity while going through substantial character development. 
As mentioned earlier, there is no formal difference between grand narratives and more 
conventional historical narratives on a smaller scale. In order for a historical narrative to 
qualify as the history of X, subject X needs to be identifiable as X at all stages of the narrative, 
despite any changes which occur to X. 
Narrative philosophies of history (White 1965; Dray 1971) refer to this self-identical 
X as the “central subject” of historical narratives. Invested with organizing and unifying 
functions, the “central subject is responsible for endowing narratives with integrity and 
comprehensibility. When prospects of unprecedented change envision to bring about a 
subject other-than-human or a non-human which potentially outperforms and supersedes 
the human subject, they threaten to eliminate the central subject of the story of history, 
thereby defying the possibility to fashion the narrative with integrity and comprehensibility. 
In other words, they fail to uphold a self-identical central subject around which a story could 
be structured and organized. For the future subject of the technological vision is not an 
altered subject of the past, but a completely another subject. Writing a history as a believable 
story to act upon requires connection and association between past and future states of affairs in 
terms of a common subject or character whose past and future is at stake. The prospect of 
unprecedented renders this connection and association impossible due to the lack of the 
common subject or character whose past and future could be at stake over the course of a 
story. 
 
 
Acting Upon a Fear of the Worst Future 
 
Although in the emerging historicity of Western societies the feasible stories cannot facilitate 
action due to the lack of an equally feasible political vision, and although the believable future 
of unprecedented change defies story form, action is still possible. As the previous section 
indicates, prospects of unprecedented change are either prospects of a complete alteration 
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or even supersession of the human condition as we know it, which may appear as 
catastrophic and dystopian. As hardly anybody would wish to facilitate the “achievement” of 
catastrophic visions, it is evident that societal action upon such prospects has to be 
characteristically different from what the modern sense of historicity entailed. 
 The catastrophic character of the envisioned future is the most obvious in the case of 
nuclear warfare and the anticipated consequences of anthropogenic climate change. It may 
seem less obvious when it comes to technology, given that even bringing about greater-than-
human intelligence may appear utopian insofar as such intelligence is controlled and created 
with the hope to benefit humanity. Nevertheless, even the seemingly shiniest prospect of a technological 
utopia is inherently dystopian, precisely because of the constant threat of losing control and also 
because of the threat posed by the fact that human reasoning is by definition unable to assess 
greater-than-human intelligence. This is what the notion of technological singularity 
describes and warns about (Vinge 1993). Regardless of whether technologically enhanced 
non-human beings are brought forth as a result of artificial intelligence research or human 
enhancement, they appear as a threat to the continuation of human life as we know it. 
Advocates of human enhancement are, of course, aware of the dystopian prospects inherent 
in their technological utopianism. “The Transhumanist Declaration” touches upon the 
threats and dangers necessarily entailed in their hopes, calling equally tragic “if the potential 
benefits failed to materialize because of technophobia and unnecessary prohibitions,” and 
“if intelligent life went extinct because of some disaster or war involving advanced 
technologies” (Bostrom 2005, 21). 
The threats and dangers of the technological vision, just as well as the threats posed 
by anthropogenic climate change, made their way lately into the consideration of the 
members of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, which installed the Doomsday Clock in 1947 
against the backdrop of nuclear threats. The symbolic function of the Clock is to convey a 
sense of how close human civilization is to potentially destroy itself. In 2017, it shows two 
and a half minutes to midnight, half a minute closer to the hour than in the previous report 
of the Bulletin, dating from 2015. It is nevertheless the 2015 report that I would like to quote 
somewhat lengthily fashion, because it wonderfully exhibits the language in which current 
debates on future prospects play out. Under the heading “Emerging Technology,” the report 
proceeds as follows: 
 
The fast pace of technological change makes it incumbent on world leaders to pay attention to the control of 
emerging science that could become a major threat to humanity. It is clear that advances in biotechnology; in 
artificial intelligence, particularly for use in robotic weapons; and in the cyber realm all have the potential to 
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create global-scale risk. The Bulletin continues to be concerned about the lag between scientific advances in 
dual-use technologies and the ability of civil society to control them. The Science and Security Board now 
repeats the advice it gave last year: The international community needs to strengthen existing institutions that 
regulate emergent technologies and to create new forums for exploring potential risks and proposing potential 
controls on those areas of scientific and technological advance that have so far been subject to little if any 
societal oversight. (Annual Report 2015) 
 
The language of “risks,” and even more, the language of a “global-scale risk” that is a “threat” 
to the entire “humanity” which in turn demands “control” is not the language of 
scaremongers only. In human enhancement debates, both bioconservatives and advocates 
of transhumanism speak the same language of threats and risks, although they may disagree 
over what exactly qualifies as threat. Whereas “the most significant threat posed by 
contemporary biotechnology” for Francis Fukuyama (2002, 7) in the bioconservative camp 
is already the prospect that it may “alter human nature and thereby move us into a 
‘posthuman’ stage of history,” many transhumanists may regard this prospect as the ultimate 
object of their desire. 
The difference of the various positions on what constitutes a threat and what is 
desired lies in dissenting views on what counts as “human.” It is not merely an accident that 
the transhumanist Bostrom, in arguing that the threat we all face today is best described as 
“existential risk,” defines the term in a way that avoids the mention of “human” for the sake 
of a wider category. According to the definition, “an existential risk is one that threatens the 
premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic 
destruction of its potential for desirable future development” (Bostrom 2013, 15). This is not 
to say that “Earth-originating intelligent life” has never faced existential risks before. It has 
happened many times in the shape of what Bostrom calls natural existential risks (asteroid 
impacts, gamma-ray bursts, and so on). What is new according to Bostrom (2013, 6) is that 
“the great bulk of existential risk in the foreseeable future consists of anthropogenic existential 
risks.” The main anthropogenic existential risks we face today are precisely the ones that 
feature in the consideration of the members of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist in setting the 
Doomsday Clock: nuclear warfare, climate change and technology. Besides, they are also the 
ones that I call as prospects of unprecedented change. 
The point I would like to make by reciting both Bostrom and the Bulletin report is 
that the specific threat that emerged in the discourse of postwar Western societies is 
extinction by human-induced activity. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to human 
extinction, leaving the room open for all dissenting views on what counts as “human.” There 
are two essential and heavily interrelated features of this emerging discourse on threats to 
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humanity that I wish to pay special attention to. The first is that the new discourse emerged 
outside the humanities and social sciences. The second is that it correspondingly speaks 
about human beings and humanity not as a cultural but as a biological-existential category, 
or at best as a category that renegotiates the cultural / biological divide (notwithstanding the 
fact that from the standard perspective of the interpretive humanities of the last decades, a 
discourse on humanity as a biological category is itself a cultural artifact). 
As to emergence of new discourse on humanity outside the humanities, it is evident 
in the case of the scientific-technological prospect of biotechnology, artificial intelligence, 
and human enhancement. The ecological prospect of anthropogenic climate change is a more 
complex case, given the extremely quick appropriation of the notion of the Anthropocene 
by the most humanities disciplines. Despite the fact that the officially yet unapproved term 
came into circulation as a geological epoch-marker (Crutzen 2002), the humanities have 
already transformed it into signaling a new socio-cultural era. This, I believe, resulted in the 
creation of a humanities literature on the Anthropocene which parallels the natural scientific 
discourse, but without much effort to understand it (see Simon 2017). For the challenge that 
the humanities in general and historical studies in particular face today lies precisely in the 
extent to which such newer ecological and technological prospects do not fit very well with 
the age-old, routinized and accustomed conceptual tools of the humanities. 
This leads straight to the second aspect. Nowhere is the unfit between the scientific 
and the humanities discourse more palpable than in the new universalism of the human of 
the Anthropocene and the (post)human of scientific-technological visions as measured 
against the old universalism of the humanities. As to the latter, humanity in the discourse of 
modern humanities has been the central subject of a unitary historical process. But this 
notion came under heavy criticism in the last half-century within humanities scholarship 
itself. Today, the common attitude toward this old universalism is to note its inherent 
Eurocentrism and its inattentiveness to inequalities in the social world. In light of take-away 
message of the previous section, all this is nothing surprising. With the idea of a historical 
process becoming unfeasible in the postwar period, a universal humanity as the central 
subject of the very historical process simply had to become unfeasible too. Complications 
arise when the standard humanities criticism of old universalism is applied to the new 
universalism of prospects of unprecedented change. For an existentially threatened humanity 
understood as a species which is part of an even greater universalism of “Earth-originating 
intelligent life” may be something completely other than a socio-politically evolving humanity 
over the course of history. 
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The case of the Anthropocene is the most illuminating in this respect. For a large 
part of humanities scholarship exhibits and attitude similar to Malm and Hornborg (2014) 
when presuming that talking about humanity necessarily means talking about socio-political 
human development, so that it seems necessary to point at intra-species inequalities and 
questions of responsibility. Nobody doubts that such questions are of utmost importance. 
The curious thing is that the attitude behind asking such indispensable questions is less of an 
actual engagement with the assumptions of current scientific literature and more of a 
projection of long-standing humanities concerns over that which otherwise is unfamiliar and 
unexplored. Contrary to this, Dipesh Chakrabarty’s attitude of attempting to comprehend 
the novelty of the universalism in scientific discourses on humanity seems a more 
sophisticated and promising one. In his early engagement, Chakrabarty (2009) was already 
mindful of how the natural scientific understanding implies a universal notion of humanity. 
Yet, he seemed to think initially that the main difficulty lies in coming to terms with a 
universalism that he thought to have a lot to do with the one he already intended to dismantle 
through his previous work of postcolonial criticism. 
Lately, however, in his Tanner Lectures, Chakrabarty (2015) has become more 
explicit about the difference between the notion of humanity featuring in current scientific 
discourses and the tradition of humanities. Being inspired by Agamben (1998), Chakrabarty 
attributes the concept of zoe (bare life) to this emerging discourse as opposed to bios (good 
life) and claims that “life, not humans, emerges as one of the main concerns of the literature 
on climate science,” Chakrabarty (2015, 142). To conceptualize the difference, Chakrabarty 
makes a distinction between homocentric and zoecentric views of the world. Whereas the former 
applies to modern histories of humanity, the latter intends to capture the emerging 
understanding of the human in climate science as one of the fellow species of the planet. 
Chakrabarty associates the former with a notion of the human as socio-politically divided 
and describes it by the Latin homo, the latter features the Greek anthropos. According to 
Chakrabarty (2015, 157) – and contrary to the bulk of humanities criticism – the anthropos of 
the Anthropocene “has no moral value and does not signify any moral culpability.” 
Chakrabarty’s engagement with present-day challenges to the Western sense of 
historicity is, I think, the most inspiring, insightful and elaborate in historical studies. It may 
even be congruent with critical posthumanism as discussed earlier. But its usefulness is 
confined to ecological concerns. From the viewpoint of a theoretical investigation into a 
larger sense of historicity behind the entire discourse on existential threats (of which 
anthropogenic climate change is only an instance), the concept of zoecentrism as focused on 
biological species both human and non-human seems less instrumental when it comes to the 
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technological vision. The most pressing theoretical task would be to conceptualize that which 
is common in the understanding of the human and humanity to the ecological and 
technological discourses, against the backdrop of that which is common to the modern 
historical understanding. I do not wish to pretend to have an answer right away to the not 
particularly modest questions implied by this task. Nor do I want to criticize Chakrabarty for 
not having such a comprehensive answer either. What I want to point out is only that coming 
to grips with this question of what is common to all discourses on threats to humanity is one 
of the most pressing tasks to face in trying to comprehend an emerging historical sensibility.  
To connect all this back to the theme of this section on the possibility of acting upon 
feasible future prospects, it is in the context of threats to a yet-to-be-understood subject that 
I would like to offer my final contention. When facing the vision of unprecedented change 
in terms of extinction, societal action no longer takes the shape of achievement. Western 
societies no longer call for action in order to achieve the best of all prospects; instead, the principal aim is now 
to avoid the future that is the worst of all. This is what motivates climate change summits, treaties 
on nuclear weapons, and debates on introducing controlling mechanisms and safety checks 
on technological innovations. Action upon a future vision is still possible, but the 
paradigmatic from of action is mitigation and aversion. Whereas utopian futures brought 
about stories of potential fulfillment as an incentive to act for a desired outcome, postwar 
visions of unprecedented change imagine worst case scenarios of potential human (?) 
extinction events as an incentive to act against.  
 
 
Being Historical Today 
 
All these, I believe, are among the fundamental features of a postwar historical sensibility. 
To avoid potential misunderstandings, in place of a conclusion I would like to make clear 
that I do not wish to claim that such a postwar historical sensibility entirely replaced the one 
brought forth by the late Enlightenment. The latter one is still present in the longing of the 
Left for progressive politics or in transhumanist visions of human enhancement (insofar as 
enhancement is understood as improvement and is confined to a continuous betterment of 
an already assumed human potential). With the heyday of postmodernism gone, it is even 
possible to witness efforts which try to revive the modern sense of historicity in its most 
vigorous shape by advocating an engagement with the deep past to see where long-term 
developments steer humanity in the future. Besides recent calls for returning to “acting upon 
a story that we can believe” as mentioned earlier, the endeavor of big history is one of the 
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most visible of such efforts. It tells what Hesketh (2014) calls the evolutionary epic, although 
in the shape of a history of the universe that happens to include human history. Then, even 
Chakrabarty (2015, 174) ends up retaining fully the modern sense of historicity by suggesting 
that “subordinating human history to the geological and evolutionary histories of the planet” 
may be the ultimate way to come to terms with the challenge of Anthropocene. But this 
would mean telling the same developmental story of history with the central subject 
humanity, except that this time the whole of history would be of an even larger scale one and 
the central subject would be a zoecentric understanding of humanity. 
Finally, the effort of Eelco Runia (2014) to provide a philosophy of history in the 
classical sense can be an example taken from the narrowly understood field of the theory and 
philosophy. At its most inspiring, Runia’s work defy the historical sensibility inherited from 
the Enlightenment by postulating a discontinuity-driven mechanism of history. At its more 
conventional, however, Runia’s philosophy of history still recourses to old patterns of 
thought by stretching the developmental continuity of a cultural evolutionary pattern over a 
mechanism of discontinuous change. Although far more examples could be mentioned, it is 
not my intention to provide a full list of the practices in which the modern idea of history 
survives even in the twenty-first century. What I wish to show is only the survival itself, and 
that two senses of historicity co-exist today, regardless of the moral judgement I would pass 
on any of them.  
My claim in this essay is confined to the novel one, emerging out of the most pressing, 
urgent and dominant concerns of our own time, conceived of as unprecedented change. 
With respect to such novel concerns all I can say is this: let’s forget about recent efforts that 
aim at reviving the modern historical sensibility, about the deep continuity of evolutionary 
thinking, and about the notion of the practical past. Let’s forget about the idea that these are 
still our best tools for coping with the issue human existence in general, and let’s forget about 
the idea that these age-old conceptual tools are what historical writing needs in order to 
regain its public status in particular. In the twenty-first century, such efforts of revival are 
not vehicles of but obstacles to a theoretical understanding of our current condition. What 
the theory and philosophy of history needs is not a nostalgic longing for a vanishing history 
culture, but an understanding of the perhaps completely different way in which we already 
conceive of ourselves and the world “historically” today. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
20  
Notes 
 
1. From the viewpoint of this essay, historians’ engagement with the Anthropocene fall into 
two categories. On the one hand, some historians ask the question of how their discipline 
may contribute to ongoing public discussion of climate change. This is the question asked 
by Guldi and Armitage (2014, 64–73). On the other hand, the more important and fruitful 
efforts follow Chakrabarty (2009) in asking the reverse question of what the Anthropocene 
demands from history. Although it makes sense to analytically differentiate between the two 
approaches, in practice they are often fused, such as in the treatment of Thomas (2014) or 
Chaplin (2017). 
 
2. Critical posthumanism is of course skeptical about technological posthumanism. In the 
concise judgement of Rosi Braidotti (2016, 17), they “combine radical expectations of 
transhumanist enhancement, with a firm reiteration of enlightenment-based values such as 
rationality and liberal individualism. Apparently nonplussed by the internal contradiction of 
combining radical change with the perpetuation of tradition, they reject the critical edge of 
posthuman theory, appease venture capitalist interventions in fundamental research and 
strike a politically conservative note.” Yet, it seems to me that the grounds for this skepticism 
is the rather uncritical acceptance of the self-narrative of technological posthumanism. 
Above, I repeatedly try to raise awareness of the fact that the radicality of technological 
posthumanism lies in its prospective aims which completely contradict to its self-narrative. 
When it comes to a comparative assessment of aims and prospects, I even think that the aim 
of critical posthumansim to extend emancipatory thinking over the non-human world by 
insisting on inherited conceptual tools (conceptual tools which have become textbook 
humanities criticism in the last decades) is far more conservative than the prospect of 
overcoming the human condition by the creation of literally posthuman beings. I 
nevertheless do not to intend this to be a value judgement as I find the conservativism of 
critical posthumanism indispensable in addressing the potential social inequalities so 
obviously entailed by technological prospects.  
 
3. For an introductory overview of the many transhumanist and posthumanist positions 
about enhancement and biotechnology see Savulescu and Bostrom (2009); Sharon (2014); 
and Agar (2013). 
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